International Bulletin of Political
Psychology
Volume 7

Issue 8

Article 3

8-27-1999

What Will Self-Admissions of Atrocities Beget? The Case of the
Serbian Nation
IBPP Editor
bloomr@erau.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp
Part of the Other Political Science Commons, and the Other Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Editor, IBPP (1999) "What Will Self-Admissions of Atrocities Beget? The Case of the Serbian Nation,"
International Bulletin of Political Psychology: Vol. 7 : Iss. 8 , Article 3.
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol7/iss8/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in International Bulletin of Political Psychology by an authorized administrator of Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu.

Editor: What Will Self-Admissions of Atrocities Beget? The Case of the Serbian Nation

International Bulletin of Political Psychology
Title: What Will Self-Admissions of Atrocities Beget? The Case of the Serbian Nation
Author: Editor
Volume: 7
Issue: 8
Date: 1999-08-27
Keywords: Atrocities, Blame, Guilt, Shame
Abstract. This article examines the possible consequences of admitting national guilt in the perpetration
of atrocities.
Many policy analysts are supporting the position that Serbia--the government and its people--not
receive many kinds of humanitarian and developmental aid. The support stems from the observation
that neither the Serbian government nor most of the Serbian people have "owned up" to the Serbian
perpetration of atrocities. The analysts assert that the Serbian government is engaging in the partially
contradictory nexus of denying that the atrocities occurred except as socially constructed by Kosovar
Albanian and Western propaganda and biased mind-sets, terming the atrocities as understandable and
proportional reactions to Kosovar Albanian atrocities, attributing the atrocities not to formal
governmental policy but to the dysfunctional behaviors of uncontrollable rogue elements, or blaming
the atrocities on Kosovar Albanians masquerading as Serbs. The analysts assert that the Serbian people
are engaging in all the above, plus asserting that it was the government's fault not the people's and/or
that it wasn't the Serbian army who was responsible but police, paramilitary, and common criminals
engaged in uncommon--if systematic and planned--behavior.
So, policy analysts maintain that "owning up" to atrocities is the key to Serbian aid. But why? In other
parts of the world, admitting to the commission of atrocities has been the intermediate goal of Truth
Commissions towards the terminal goal of healing a nation and marching forward to the construction of
a new world--as in South Africa. The assumption of these Truth Commissions is that the level and
intensity of violence has been so severe and so widespread that bringing all perpetrators to justice
through legal adjudication would be prohibitive and would too greatly impede the New World sought by
citizens looking out and living in a New Time. Yet some sort of justice to victims and their survivors is
needed. Thus the Truth Commission.
Yet--even in the case of the Truth Commission--admitting to atrocities is less than necessarily optimal to
and for a better future. In other cases--such as Chile--a better future has occurred subsequent to
pardoning the perpetrators of atrocities without any "owning up" at all. In still other cases there may be
no attempt at forcing an account--not even the vaguely implicit accounting suggested by pardoning--or
there may be some symbolic trials of top-level political leaders and/or lower-level perpetrators. The
results of these policies are mixed. For example, in the cases of Nazi Germany and the Japan of Tojo, an
extremely successful future followed no serious attempt to force an admission of guilt upon a nation,
only a regime. In the case of the Kaiser's Germany, a regime's admission of guilt merely for war as
opposed to war atrocities led to a further war in which atrocities occurred.
Forcing a nation to admit guilt seems close to stereotyping an entire "them." One then asserts that the
entire nation springs from, or is characterized by, bad seed or some mark or taint. There is little from the
historical and social sciences to suggest such can be the case. Moreover, if this were the case, why
would admission of guilt change future behavior--even if there would there be experienced guilt, shame,
blame?
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One is left with the realization that policy analysts' demands for public expiation, contrition, and
confession of a nation are based less on hopes for a better future but on revenge for the past, projection
of one's own malignant tendencies, and a figurative sacrifice of one's other--as is often the case when
admissions of guilt are demanded from individual perpetrators of evil. In these ways, policy analysts are
little different from those they attack. (See Bergler, E. (1952). The superego: Unconscious conscience.
Madison, CT: International Universities Press. Inc.; Ferguson, T.J., et al. (1999). Guilt, shame, and
symptoms in children. Developmental Psychology, 35, 347-357; Ferguson, T.J., et al. (1997). Temporal
dynamics of guilt: Changes in the role of interpersonal and intrapsychic factors. European Journal of
Social Psychology, 27, 659-673; Stolorow, R.D. (1985). Toward a pure psychology of inner conflict. In A.
Goldberg et al. (Ed.). Progress in self psychology Vol. 1. (pp. 193-201). NY: Guilford Press; Sullivan, S.
(August 21, 1999). Milosevic is one problem. National denial is the other. The New York Times, p. A23.)
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